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THE JOURNALISM RATINGS BOARD: AN INCENTIVE-BASED
APPROACH TO CABLE NEWS ACCOUNTABILITY
Andrew Selbst*
The American establishment media is in crisis. With newsmakers primarily driven
by profit, sensationalism and partisanship shape news coverage at the expense of
information necessary for effective self-government. Focused on cable news in par-
ticular this Note proposes a Journalism Ratings Board to periodically rate news
programs based on principles of good journalism. The Board will publish periodic
reports and display the news programs' ratings during the programs themselves,
similar to parental guidelines for entertainment programs. In a political and legal
climate hostile to command-and-control regulation, such an incentive-based ap-
proach will help cable news fulfill the democratic function of the press.
INTRODUCTION
The decline of modem mass media is well documented.' In its
most recent catastrophic failings, mass media have missed the case
against war in Iraq, missed the signs of the mortgage crisis and fi-
nancial meltdown, and helped convince a substantial portion of
the American populace that President Obama is secretly from
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Michigan Law School; Executive Editor, Univer-
sity ofMichiganJournal ofLaw Reform, Volume 44. I would like to thank Professor Len Niehoff
for pointing the way for my initial research and providing a healthy dose of skepticism,
Professor Steven Croley for letting me know that the impossible in administrative law was, in
fact, impossible and for suggesting alternatives, as well as everyone who took the time to
listen to my thoughts on this topic over the last two years. I would also like to thank Sam
VanVolkenburgh, Jesse Kirchner, Lauren Smith, and Rob Smith, of the Volume 44 editorial
staff, whose editing was invaluable to publishing this Note.
1. For criticisms by traditional journalists and bloggers, see, for example, LEONARD
DOWNIE, JR. & ROBERT G. KAISER, THE NEWS ABOUT THE NEWS: AMERICAN JOURNALISM IN
PERIL (2002); Glenn Greenwald, Jeffrey Rosen, TNR and the Anonymous Smears Against Sonia
Sotomayor, SALON (May 5, 2009, 6:52 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn
greenwald/2009/05/05/tnr. Many of Greenwald's other posts in this blog address the same
issues.
2. See generally GREG MITCHELL, So WRONG FOR So LONG: HOW THE PRESS, THE PUN-
DITS-AND THE PRESIDENT-FAILED ON IRAQ (2008) (arguing that American establishment
media failed to objectively evaluate political justifications for the Iraq war).
3. E.g., David Bauder, Abrams Research Survey: Financial journalists Say Media Dropped
Ball on Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2009, 3:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2009/01/08/abrams-research-survey-fi-n_156369.html; Dan Gillmor, The Medias Role
in the Financial Crisis, TPMCAF (Jan. 23, 2009, 09:40 AM), http://
tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/ 01/23/themediasroleinthe-financial-crisis.
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Kenya and that he wants to euthanize seniors as part of his health-
care agenda.5 The Sunday cable talk shows continue to host public
figures who have lied repeatedly without correction.6 Major media
outlets employed "independent" military analysts during the
debates about war in Iraq and Afghanistan, without disclosing that
they were receiving talking points from the Pentagon, and then
subsequently blackballed the Pulitzer-Prize winning stories that
disclosed this practice." That these are substantial failings of the
media is beyond debate.9 In addition, many smaller problems per-
vade the media daily. Those problems include an overreliance on
anonymous sourceso and "horse-race" political reporting, in which
news programs discuss the effect of policy positions on politicians'
popularity at the expense of discussing the positions and issues
themselves."
It is often said that the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom
of the press guarantees the freedom for the press to be irresponsi-
ble.12 This view has left the press to self-regulate under ethical
codes of conduct, much like lawyers" and doctors. 4 However, vari-
ous laws and private remedies prevent doctors and lawyers from
straying from their ethical codes, while the Constitution bars any
4. Sam Stein, New Poll: Less than Half of Republicans Believe Obama Was Born in U.S.,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 30, 2009, 01:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonposLcom/2009/07/
31/new-poll-less-than-half-on_248470.html.
5. Greg Sargent, Poll. Nearly Half of Americans Believe "Death Panel"Falsehood, THE PLUM
LINE (Aug. 19, 2009, 11:23 AM), http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/political-media/poll-
nearly-half-of-americans-believe-death-panel-falsehood.
6. See, e.g., Steve Benen, The Never-Ending Disappointment of the Sunday Shows, POLITI-
CAL ANIMAL (Mar. 6, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/
individual/201003/022732.php. The problem has become so pervasive that a recent
movement has arisen with the specific purpose of fact-checking Sunday news programs. See
infra notes 136, 274-276 and accompanying text.
7. David Barstow, Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon's Hidden Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
2008, at Al.
8. Glenn Greenwald, The Pulitzer-Winning Investigation that Dare Not Be Uttered on TV
SALON (Apr. 21, 2009, 8:27 AM), http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2009/04/
21 /pulitzer/index.html.
9. Although most, if not all, of the examples cited here are of problems that originat-
ed under a conservative administration, the complaints about media are decidedly not
complaints about conservative news media, but rather establishment media outlets at large.
The prominence of examples of conservative origin merely reflects the fact that a conserva-
tive administration has occupied Washington for the much of the past decade.
10. E.g., Greenwald, supra note 1; see also infra notes 177-181 and accompanying text.
11. Lili Levi, In Search of Regulatory Equilibrium, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1321, 1327 (2007).
12. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
13. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009).
14. SeeAMA CODE OF MED. ETHIcs (2010).
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such deterrence in journalism. Most of the problems mentioned
above, and indeed the entire crisis of journalism and democracy,
would not have happened if the press had not systematically disre-
garded its obligation to the public in search of profit. 6 The view that
the First Amendment only allows the media to police themselves,
therefore, while still popular, cannot be correct as an absolute prop-
osition. The press is just too important.
So if some restrictions on individual press freedom are neces-
sary, what form can they take? Because the media's primary
responsibility is to function as a watchdog over those in power,
there are obvious dangers in giving the government authority to
regulate the media." Attempts to regulate media content will be
subject to strict scrutiny8 and, as is proper, be struck down by the
courts. Even the Fairness Doctrine, which once required the airing
of multiple sides of political debates on broadcasts, has been aban-
doned in the face of intense political and constitutional battles.'9
Recognizing the dangers of direct content regulation, several
commentators have suggested incentive-based regulation to pro-
mote quality journalism.0 This Note proposes one such approach.
First, this Note proposes legislation that would create the Jour-
nalism Ratings Board (JRB), a new sub-agency within the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). The JRB would periodically
grade the quality of the news according to foundational journalistic
principles, and issue regular reports on the quality of cable news
programs. Second, the same legislation would require news pro-
grams to display their JRB ratings during each broadcast, similar in
form to parental guidelines for entertainment programs.2 This
would directly provide news consumers with concrete information
15. Cf N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that a newspa-
per can be liable for tortious libel against a public figure only upon a showing of "actual
malice").
16. See infta Part I.C.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994).
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity,
and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 1389, 1463-67 (2004); Levi, supra
note 11, at 1336-37; see also Robert M. Entman, The Nature and Sources of News, in THE PRESS
48, 54 (Geneva Overholser & Kathleen Hall Jamieson eds., 2005) (identifying "[c] hecks on
pure profit maximization" as a central guideline for good journalism).
21. FAQs About the TV Parental Guidelines, THE TV PARENTAL GUIDELINES, http://
www.tvguidelines.org/faqs.htm#faql (last visited Sept. 29, 2010) ("A ratings icon appears in
the upper left corner of the TV screen during the first 15 seconds of the program. If the
program is more than one hour, the icon will reappear at the beginning of the second hour.
Many broadcast and cable television networks also display the rating after each commercial
break.").
WINTER 2011 ] 469
470 University of Michigan journal of Law Reform [VOL. 44:2
about the quality of the program's journalism, forcing the news
networks to compete on quality rather than merely on sensational-
ism and partisanship.
This Note limits the scope of the proposal to cable news. There
are three reasons for this limitation. First, the media's problems
are too big, and no one solution will be a panacea." Therefore, any
proposal must be limited. While scholars have proposed the gen-
eral idea of incentive-based reforms, few specific proposals have
been made.2 ' Alternative solutions proposed by various scholars
include establishing a right of access,24 structural regulations that
increase diversity of ownership,25 and reliance on the democratiz-
ing power of the internet.26 A variety of approaches are required to
"fix" the media, and this Note proposes just one.
22. See State of the News Media 2009: Overview-Major Trends, PEw PROJECT FOR Ex-
CELLENCE IN JOURNALISM (2009), http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2009/narrative_
overviewmajortrends.php?media-1&cat=1; Levi, supra note 11, at 1324. Professor Levi sug-
gests four experimental ideas for media reform:
1) structural regulations designed to promote journalistic values; 2) a requirement
that broadcasters spend a certain percentage of their gross advertising revenues
on news and public affairs production and programming; 3) ... a requirement
that broadcasters devote a percentage of their advertising time to advocacy
advertising ... ; and 4) audience empowerment, including disclosure-oriented
requirements designed to foster audience activism and strategies to engage an
audience whose attention is claimed by an unprecedented abundance of content.
Levi, supra note 11, at 1324.
23. The only incentive-based proposals I have seen discussed are government subsidies
of media, analyzed in Ellen P. Goodman, Bargains in the Information Marketplace: The Use of
Government Subsidies to Regulate New Media, 1 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 217 (2002).
Professor Levi also identifies a role for incentive-based reform through "structural regula-
tions designed to promote journalistic values," supra note 11, at 1324, but she stops short of
proposing a specific incentive-based reform. Id. at 1337 ("Incentive-based approaches
should also be explored, but the details of such approaches are beyond the scope of this
Article."). This Note combines the principle of an incentive-based reform with a form of
disclosure-based audience empowerment, Levi's fourth suggestion. See Levi, supra note 11, at
1324.
24. SeeJerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1641, 1666-78 (1967).
25. Levi, supra note 11, at 1323. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION
AND DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERs (2007) (exploring problems associated with
concentrated media ownership).
26. The idea that open access to the internet will naturally solve many media problems
is a common but flawed view. See Robert W. McChesney, The Emerging Struggle for a Free Press,
in THE FUTURE OF MEDIA: RESISTANCE AND REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 9, 17 (Robert W.
McChesney et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF MEDIA]. While the internet is
fundamentally changing the public's interaction with information, it cannot do so by its
mere existence. The battle for so-called "net neutrality" will determine the future democrat-
ic nature of the internet. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Why You Should Care About Network Neutrality,
SLATE (May 1, 2006, 4:35 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2140850/. To date, only heavy
government subsidy and open-access policies have ensured that the internet is the wide
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Second, cable news is the only news source consistently gaining
market share and influence. In 2008, the only forms of news media
to increase revenues were the internet and cable news, but internet
27revenues have increased at a slower rate than in previous years.
Advertising revenue, which drives profitability, increased on the
internet by 10.6%2" and on cable news by 33%29 in 2008. Moreover,
in a recent survey, about half of Americans reported watching tele-
vision as their primary news source, compared with 15% who use
the internet, and 10% who read newspapers." Finally, cable news is
given significantly more weight in national policy debates because
politicians and staffers watch it all day, every day.3' Because cable
news is such a dominant news source for Americans, reforming ca-
ble news would have a notable effect on public discourse.
A third reason for this limitation is purely practical. Attempting
to define the "media" as a whole is a daunting, if not impossible,
task. A solution that attempts to solve all the problems at once will
be convoluted and long enough to merit a multi-volume treatise.
open forum of the present, where everyone has equal ability to publish and obtain infor-
mation. McChesney, supra. The promise of open access is one reason many observers believe
that the internet will resolve most of the tensions in media access. Id. Only time will tell if
the policies continue to favor openness or not and what effect that has on media access.
Similarly, critics suggest that any media reform that does not take into account the sub-
stantial and unique impact of new media, like the internet, is fundamentally unsound.
Leonard M. Niehoff, Rationing the Infinite, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1019, 1030 (2009) (reviewing
BAKER, supra note 25). Without addressing new media, the argument goes, regulation will
only affect a small portion of the essentially infinite content that exists, an attempt to "ration
an infinite resource." Id. at 1038. However, consumers have only a finite amount of time to
absorb news. Goodman, supra note 20, at 1392-93. We have reached a juncture where the
infinite content surpasses people's capacity to absorb news, and the attention of news con-
sumers becomes a new limiting resource. Id. Given this reality, a proposal aimed at a
particularly dominant news source is relevant.
27. State of the News Media 2009: Online-Economics, PEW PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE
IN JOURNALISM (2009), http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2009/narrativeonlineeconomics.
php?media-5&cat=3. This report also concludes that there is not yet a workable revenue
model for internet news. Without a workable model, it is unclear if new media will ever over-
take cable news as the public's dominant news source. Id.
28. Id. The reported advertising revenue refers to all websites, including news and
others. Id. Notably, this is a big step down from the previous year's 26%. Id.
29. State of the News Media 2009: Cable TV-Economics, PEW PROJECT FOR EXCEL-
LENCE IN JOURNALISM (2009), http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2009/narrative-cablety
economics.php?media=7&cat=3.
30. State of the First Amendment 2009, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., 1 (2009), http://
www.firstamendmentcenter.org/pdf/SOFA2009.analysis.tables.pdf.
31. Atrios, The Cable News Problem, ESCHATON (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.eschatonblog.
com/2010/03/cable-news-problem.html; Matthew Yglesias, The Cable News Problem, THINK
PROGRESS (Mar. 9, 2010, 5:31 PM), http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/archives/2010/03/
the-cable-news-problem.php.
32. Niehoff, supra note 26, at 1030.
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By limiting the scope of the issue, this Note proposes a full solution
to a smaller problem.
Part I of this Note describes the current state of media regula-
tion and its governing constitutional framework. Parts II and III lay
out the details of the proposed reform, assuming its constitutional-
ity. Part II discusses the structure of the JRB, including the proper
sources of journalism standards and strategies for reducing the
likelihood of partisan takeover and regulatory capture. Part III de-
scribes the legal process and utility of displaying "news consumer
guidelines" on the screen during the news programs themselves.
Part IV discusses the constitutionality of the proposal, concluding
that it would be constitutional.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF MEDIA REGULATION
In order to demonstrate the necessity of incentive-based regula-
tion such as that proposed by this Note, this Part lays out the
current shape of media regulation and the constitutional space it
occupies. As mass media have progressed from political pamphlet-
eering to the modern-day newspaper, radio, broadcast television,
cable, and internet, the public's relationship to the press has
changed drastically. At the drafting of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, protecting the press from the gov-
ernment was the primary concern.34 But improvements in
technology have created more powerful and influential mass me-
dia institutions, which have the power to choose who may or may
not be heard, inhibiting individual speech in ways the drafters of
the First Amendment could have never imagined." Despite this
potential inhibition of individual speech, however, First Amend-
ment doctrine and political realities have combined to protect
mass media corporations at the expense of the forum for individu-
al speech. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's 1969
pronouncement that "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount,"0 both First
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press. . . .").
34. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 527 (1977); see also DOWNIE & KAISER, supra note 1, at 15; JAMES FALLOWS,
BREAKING THE NEWs: How THE MEDIA UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 48 (1996) (dis-
cussing partisan political function of newspapers in early American history).
35. See infra Part IA3.
36. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
472 [VOL. 44:2
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Amendment doctrine and the political climate have become hos-
tile to regulation designed to effectuate those rights.
A. A Brief Historical Tour of the First Amendment's Press Clause
The Framers of the Constitution realized that the press was
essential to a functioning democracy. Thomas Jefferson famously
said, "were it left to me to decide whether we should have a gov-
ernment without newspapers, or newspapers without a govern-
government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.""
At the time of the First Amendment's drafting, the Framers' pri-
mary concern was protecting the press from the government. As
the structure of the press has changed over time, so have Supreme
Court doctrine and the public's understanding of the press clause.
Underlying each step of this evolution is the principle that a free
press is primarily valuable for its service to democracy. This Part
discusses the evolution of the press clause and how well the press
has served democracy over time.
1. Partisan News
When the First Amendment was drafted, the government's abil-
ity to silence journalists posed the greatest threat to the press's
ability to inform public debate. Journalists were an important
check on government, necessary to root out the ugly parts of law-
making that the people in power might otherwise want hidden. 8 At
the same time, it was inconceivable that any one news source could
drown out the rest and shape public debate by itself; eighteenth
century technology prevented any large-scale market dominance.
Journalists were instead the "little guys" standing up to govern-
ment.
In the early days of the country, protecting the press was protect-
ing political debate. Newspapers were simply arms of the political
37. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), in 2
MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 84,
85 (ThomasJefferson Randolph ed., 1829).
38. Blasi, supra note 34, at 527, 533, 534.
39. The federal government did not even consider private power to overwhelm de-
bate-as opposed to government interference-until the FCC promulgated chain
broadcasting regulations in 1941. See Nat'1 Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 198
(1943) ("Chain broadcasting makes possible a wider reception for expensive entertainment
and cultural programs and also for programs of national or regional significance which
would otherwise have coverage only in the locality of origin.").
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parties.4 Despite the propensity for these papers to perform the
worst sorts of journalism-smearing opponents and spreading
scandal-the Framers decided that even this version of the press
was so important that it warranted constitutional protection." The
protection proved necessary. Some of the very same people who
drafted the First Amendment later passed the Sedition Act of 1798,
penalizing speech critical of the government.42 This law was never
challenged in the Supreme Court, but had the law not expired in
1801, it certainly would have been struck down.
For over a century, the public interest needed no protection,
primarily because news outlets faced competition and were locally
owned; knowing where to find the owners ensured accountability.43
As an additional consequence of local ownership, when law and
policy makers gathered, each brought news from disparate sources,
making it difficult for a single news source to dominate the public
discourse.
2. Professional Journalism and Self-Regulation
By the 1830s and 1840s, newspapers had left the partisan model
to become more independent." A few New York papers-in partic-
ular, the Herald, the Tribune, and the Times--began reporting more
unbiased and in-depth coverage of public affairs.4 5 "l[T]he first
quality newspapers" began to appear by the turn of the century,
and journalism standards grew as the trade became more profes-
sional.46 In the 1920s, competition from radio, which could report
breaking news earlier, forced newspapers to focus more on "better-
informed and more interpretive reporting on politics, economics,
labor relations, science, medicine and agriculture."
Between the Great Depression and the early 1950s, however,
newspapers began to lose their watchdog role, reflecting estab-
lishment views more often than holding the powerful
accountable. Media subservience to government peaked in the
40. DOWNIE & KAISER, supra note 1, at 15; FALLOWS, supra note 34, at 48.
41. DOWNIE & KAISER, supra note 1, at 15.
42. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
43. See DOWNIE & KAISER, supra note 1, at 23.
44. Id. at 15; FALLOWs, supra note 34, at 48.
45. DOWNIE & KAISER, supra note 1, at 16; FALLOws, supra note 34, at 48.
46. DOWNIE & KAISER, supra note 1, at 17-18.
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id. This period in journalism presented problems that seem to mirror today's. See,
e.g., Glenn Greenwald, New Study Documents Media's Servitude to Government, SALON
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1950s as many newspapers stood silent while Senator Joseph
McCarthy ruined many lives.49 However, as McCarthyism faded, the
proliferation of television brought dramatic live events such as
speeches, press conferences, and eventually the civil rights marches
and anti-war protests of the 1960s into American living rooms.5 0
Television ushered in what many consider the "Golden Age" of
journalism.51
As the "Golden Age" engendered increasing resentment against
the media by the powerful, the Supreme Court was called upon to
protect the media. In 1964, the Court decided New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, in which a political candidate sued the New York Times
for libel." Ruling for the New York Times, the Court held that ab-
sent "actual malice," defined as intentional or reckless disregard
for the truth of a statement, the First Amendment permits newspa-
pers to print any information regarding public officials. The late
1960s brought a sustained attack on the press by President Richard
Nixon, requiring the Supreme Court to once again protect the
New York Times, this time for releasing the Pentagon Papers. Ten
years later, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Court
struck down a Florida statute requiring newspapers to print a polit-
ical candidate's response to published allegations.56 The Court
reasoned that even a limited right-of-reply statute amounted to
compelled speech and an impermissible infringement on editorial
autonomy. In 1973, the plurality in Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee nicely summed up the Court's
attitude about newspapers' autonomy: "The power of a privately
owned newspaper to advance its own political, social, and econom-
ic views is bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance of a
sufficient number of readers-and hence advertisers-to assure
(June 30, 2010, 5:31 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/
06/30/media.
49. Jordan Michael Smith, Stenography Machines: Attention, Mr Peristein: There's Nothing
New About 'He Said/She Said,' COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. (Aug. 25, 2009, 8:00 AM) http://
www.cjr.org/behindthe news/stenography-machines.php.
50. DOWNIE & KAISER, supra note 1, at 20.
51. Id. at 21 (discussing the popularity ofjournalism as a university major and increase
of investigative reporting during the 1960s and 1970s); cf ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY & JOHN
NICHOLS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AMERICAN JOURNALIsM 43 (2010) (acknowledging,
though not accepting, the common conception of a "Golden Age").
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
53. Id. at 279-80.
54. DOWNIE & KAISER, supra note 1, at 20-21.
55. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
56. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
57. Id. at 254.
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financial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity of its edi-
tors and publishers.""
Because most of the Supreme Court precedent regarding news-
papers developed during the "Golden Age" of journalism,
newspapers enjoy near absolute editorial freedom primarily as an
accident of history.5 9 The Court relied on journalistic integrity to
preserve the public interest.6 The Court did not reason that edito-
rial autonomy and free speech are ends unto themselves, but
rather that they are means to enhance public discourse. Illustrating
this was the Court's emphasis on the need for multiple voices is
public discourse:
The constitutional safeguard [created by the First Amend-
ment] . . . "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people." "The maintenance of the opportunity
for free political discussion to the end that government may
be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may
be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
constitutional system.". . . The First Amendment, said Judge
Learned Hand, "presupposes that right conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is,
and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."6 1
This decision was rendered when competition among news organi-
zations was much greater than it is today.6 2 Each newspaper was
considered merely one voice among the desired multitude, and the
First Amendment was asked only to protect a newspaper's ability to
speak. As competition within cities has dwindled and news organi-
zations have consolidated, few voices now exist where there once
were many. Nevertheless, the doctrine of editorial autonomy per-
sists.
58. 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973).
59. See DOWNIE & KAISER, supra note 1, at 21.
60. See Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U.S. at 117.
61. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,
369 (1931); United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
62. BAKER, supra note 25, at 1-4; see also DOWNIE & KAISER, supra note 1, at 23.
476 [VOL. 44:2
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3. Broadcast Media and the Scarcity Rationale
The proliferation of radio changed media regulation for good,
as would each subsequent new technology. In 1934, Congress cre-
ated the FCC and granted it the power to regulate all "interstate
and foreign commerce in communication by wire or radio."6 3
Shortly after the creation of the FCC, the Court acknowledged that
the Commission was "empowered to deal ... with [more than]
technical and engineering impediments to the 'larger and more
effective use of radio in the public interest."" National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States was the first case to address the new unilateral
nature of communications and democratic debate that emerged
with broadcasting. Against a statutory and First Amendment chal-
lenge, the Court upheld chain-broadcasting regulations, ownership
restrictions the FCC placed on broadcasters who owned multiple
radio stations in various locales.'5 Rejecting the claim that the regu-
lations were arbitrary and capricious, the Court found the FCC had
amassed significant evidence that radio station conglomerates were
increasingly able to dominate the airwaves, effectively crowding out
66,
smaller independent stations.
National Broadcasting also marked the first appearance of the
scarcity rationale. Rejecting the First Amendment claim, the Court
explained that "[f]reedom of utterance is abridged to many who
wish to use the limited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of
expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That is its
unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of
expression, it is subject to governmental regulation."" The facilities
were limited because the FCC carved up broad ranges of
frequencies and licensed them to avoid interference between sta-
tions broadcasting too close in frequency." The Court reasoned
that because the government must already regulate licenses to
prevent complete suppression of speech through interference,
63. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified as amend-
ed at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
64. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
65. Id. The rules themselves were implemented to preserve competition in different
local markets, and to protect smaller stations' ability to start up. Comment, The Impact of the
FCC's Chain Broadcasting Rules, 60 YALE L.J. 78, 85 (1951). Specifically, the rules prohibited 1)
ownership of more than one station in any single market or 2) ownership by a chain broad-
caster of any station in a market that was not otherwise adequately served. Id. at 86.
66. Nat'1 Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 235.
67. Id. at 226.
68. Id. at 215.
477WINTER 2011 ]
University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
the government was also justified in imposing restrictions to fur-
ther the ends of diversity in speech.69
The scarcity rationale formed the basis for Red Lion v. FCC, the
greatest Supreme Court victory for media access to date. 0 In Red
Lion, the Court upheld the Fairness Doctrine, the FCC's principal
attempt to regulate broadcasters in the public interest." As sum-
marized by one scholar, the Fairness Doctrine "required
broadcasters to cover issues of public importance and to do so in a
balanced manner, giving both sides of the story (or as many sides
as there might be) . Applying the doctrine to newspapers would
have amounted to compelled speech and violated the First
Amendment. But according to the Court, the scarcity rationale
meant the First Amendment applied differently to broadcasting
than to newspapers.74 Strikingly, the Court, in its most famous sen-
tence regarding media access, again used strong language that
would seem to indicate support of the public's speech rights gen-
erally: "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount."" The tone was similar to
other statements the Court had made with regard to the public
interest. For example, the Court has stated that the "widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources" was a goal of the First Amendment.76
Today, however, Red Lion is an outlier in First Amendment law
governing the media. Cable television did not require broadcast
licenses, and was analyzed differently as a result. The leading case
regarding cable regulations is Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
(Turner 1).7 At issue in Turner I were the "must-carry" provisions of
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
69. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) ("[Speech di-
versity] has long been a basic tenet of national communications policy . . . ." (quoting
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972) (plurality opinion)
(internal quotation marks omitted))). For further discussion about diversity in media policy,
see Goodman, supra note 20, at 1395-99.
70. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). For additional discussion of Red
Lion in historical context, see AngelaJ. Campbell, A Historical Perspective on the Public's Right of
Access to the Media, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1027, 1029-35 (2007).
71. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400-01.
72. OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 56 (1996).
73. Id.
74. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
75. Id.
76. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (quoted in FCC v. Nat'l Cit-
izens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978)). Professor Goodman provides more
examples of similarly strong statements. See Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy and Free Speech:
The First Amendment at War with Itse4/35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1211, 1230 (2007).
77. Goodman, supra note 76, at 1227.
78. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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1992.79 The provisions required cable operators that carried na-
tionally broadcast channels to carry local broadcast channels as
well.80 The FCC worried that as cable became the dominant televi-
sion source, cable companies would have an unfair advantage over
local broadcast stations. Because only one cable line goes into each
residence, cable companies controlling those lines could have pre-
vented local programming from entering a home."' This, the FCC
argued, would lead to the demise of local broadcast television."2
Turner Broadcasting Systems argued that the provisions were con-
tent-based and benefited local stations at Turner Broadcasting's
expense. Eventually, after rejecting that argument, developing a
new level of scrutiny for content-neutral cable regulations, and re-
manding the case for more evidentiary support, the Court sided
with the FCC and upheld the provisions in Turner I.f8
Turner I illustrates three important points about the constitu-
tional framework outside the scarcity rationale. First, all media
regulation must survive fairly rigorous scrutiny. The Turner I Court
began its analysis by restating the proposition that content-based
regulations are subject to strict scrutiny.8 5 It then decided that con-
tent-neutral regulation of cable providers must be considered
under less rigorous scrutiny, described by one commentator as "in-
termediate-plus."" While the Court explained that intermediate
scrutiny, typically a very deferential test, governs content-neutral
87regulation of cable providers, it also required that the FCC pro-
88
vide "substantial evidence" in support of any regulation.
Accordingly, cable networks have almost the same editorial control
as newspapers, and even indirect regulations, such as ownership
restrictions89 and must-carry regulations, are inherently suspect.
Any regulation will be invalidated absent plentiful justifying evi-
dence.
The second point illustrated by Turner I is the dichotomy in
treatment between speech regulation and economic regulation.
Aside from the rare scarcity rationale cases, courts have only
79. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534 (b) (1) (B), 534 (h) (1) (A), 535 (a) (2006).
80. Id.
81. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 646-47.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 646.
84. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,185-89 (1997).
85. Turner , 512 U.S. at 642.
86. Goodman, supra note 76, at 1219.
87. Turner , 512 U.S. at 642.
88. Id. at 666.
89. See infra Part I.C.
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upheld economic regulations of the media.' Professor Ellen
Goodman has observed that the dichotomy between economic and
speech regulation is so firmly entrenched that it predictably shapes
current litigants' arguments around First Amendment rights and
values.9'
Finally, Turner I affirmed the First Amendment's commitment to
preserving content diversity. The Supreme Court confirmed that
the public's ability to understand its local community, to hear dif-
ferent voices, and to share different perspectives is vital to a well-
functioning democracy.9 2
B. The Political Lessons of the Fairness Doctrine's Demise
Political realities have played an important role in shaping me-
dia regulation. The demise of the Fairness Doctrine is a good
example. Merely five years after Red Lion upheld the Fairness Doc-
trine in order to protect the public interest, the Court ignored the
doctrine in Tornillo. Despite multiple briefs asking the Court to
overturn Red Lion, the Tornillo Court reached a diametrically op-
posed outcome without even mentioning Red Lion.9 3 Red Lion was
rendered "at best a crippled precedent,"9 4 and Tornillo gave the
Reagan Administration's FCC enough ammunition to abolish the
Fairness Doctrine in 1987." The administration pointed to the in-
vention of cable television and reasoned that it could not support
the Doctrine; the scarcity rationale no longer applied because tele-
vision no longer depended on spectrum licensing. Congress's
later efforts to legislate the Doctrine were vetoed by President
Reagan.
In 2000, the personal attack rules, a "corollary to the [F]airness
[D]octrine" mandating that broadcasters provide an opportunity
for public figures attacked on the air to reply in kind, were also
90. See Goodman, supra note 76, at 1223-24. The line between economic and substan-
tive regulation is not always clear. For example, ownership restrictions, while often
considered economic in nature, limit the speech capabilities of broadcasters. The real lesson
here is that when the Court wants to uphold a regulation, it will characterize it as economic.
Id. at 1231.
91. Id.
92. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663-64.
93. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Media-A Contemporary Appraisal, 35 HoFSrA L.
REv. 937, 943 (2007).
94. Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DuKE
L.J. 899, 965 (1998).
95. Fiss, supra note 72, at 59; Robinson, supra note 94, at 966.
96. Fiss, supra note 72, at 59.
97. Id.
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repealed.9 8 Today, any mention of the Fairness Doctrine in Con-
gress incites hysteria among conservatives."9 The political lesson
drawn from the history and current disfavor of the Fairness Doc-
trine and similar regulation is that any attempt to regulate speech
directly is infeasible. Media regulation is viewed cynically as "gov-
ernment interference in order to prevent government
interference," rather than an attempt to foster a fuller, richer de-
bate; free-market principles reign supreme. Subtler, weaker forms
of regulation must suffice unless and until this attitude changes.
C. Current Media Regulation
While the current problems with journalism are uniformly rec-
ognized, considerably less agreement exists about the causes of
those problems, and accordingly, the correct solutions. The politi-
cal and constitutional constraints prevent any sweeping regulation,
requiring reform to instead address very specific causes. The cause
most cited by media critics is the consolidation of media ownership
into corporate giants. 00 When news organizations were principally
owned by individuals or small families, the primary goal of owners
was not profits, but rather enhancing the outlet's public-interest
contributions.'o' Owners of large corporations, however, tend to
view their news outlets as profit-making divisions.o2 So profit-
centric is modern media that television networks demand individ-
ual news programs to be profitable. 3
Because many critics believe consolidation is a major problem,
much current regulation deals with media ownership; the courts
98. Barron, supra note 92, at 943; see also Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. FCC, 229
F.3d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (issuing a writ of mandamus requiring the FCC to repeal the
personal attack rules because the Commission never provided adequate justification).
99. See, e.g., Michael Calderone, Sen. Harkin: 'We Need the Fairness Doctrine Back,' POLITI-
co (Feb. 11, 2009, 09:08 AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/michaelcalderone/
0209/SenHarkinWeneed theFairnessDoctrineback_.html; Brian Maloney, Dem Sena-
tor Outlines Vindictive Plan to Eliminate Talk Radio, RADIO EQUALIZER (Oct. 22, 2008, 2:11 PM),
http://radioequalizer.blogspot.com/2008/10/new-mexico-democrat-will-push-to.html. The
hysteria is evident in the conservative characterizations within these blog posts, describing the
Fairness Doctrine as a "vindictive plan to eliminate talk radio," as well as other Senators' re-
sponses. See, e.g., Dan Riehl, Boehner Challenges Bingaman on So-Called "Fairness" Doctrine,
RIEHL WoRLD VIEW (Oct. 23, 2008, 04:31 PM), http://www.riehlworldview.com/carnivorous
conservative/2008/10/boehner-challenges-bingaman-on-so-called-fairness-doctrine.html.
100. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 25, at 1-4.
101. DOWNIE & KAISER, supra note 1, at 25-26.
102. Levi, supra note 11, at 1324-25.
103. Id. at 1325.
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view such regulation as an acceptable economic restriction.1 0 4 An-
other school of thought, however, questions whether media
consolidation is a problem at all. 05 This school rejects regulation as
a solution to any of media's failings. Proponents of this view believe
that when media companies merge, they increase their ability to
capitalize on economies of scale.06 Thus, they argue, the compa-
nies could devote more resources to news and less to
competition.o7 Even under this view, however, profit remains the
companies' ultimate concern, and profit-maximizing measures are
likely to trump better journalistic practices. It is because financial
considerations drive editorial decision-making that an incentive-
based approach is required.
The profit motive has created various problems for the press. os
The focus on the bottom line has significantly reduced the re-
sources spent on news gathering and reporting.' Cutbacks in
staffing lead to larger workloads for the remaining reporters.no Ed-
itors therefore seek out the easiest stories, and reporters tend to
rely more on government press releases."' Investigative journalism,
the most resource-intensive form of journalism, is often eliminated
first.'1 2 Ultimately, cost reductions induced by unbridled concern
for profit significantly undermine the press's ability to perform its
watchdog duties."
For electronic media in particular, the profit focus has discour-
aged controversial news unpopular with advertisers, and has
instead incentivized programming directed at advertisers' pre-
ferred audience demographics.' 4 The news programs have cut the
amount of news in each broadcast to allow for more advertising
and have reduced coverage of government significantly."' The
104. See generally BAKER, supra note 25 (exploring problems associated with concentrat-
ed media ownership).
105. See, e.g., THOMAS G. KRATrENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROAD-
CAST PROGRAMMING 292-94 (1994); LUCAS A. POWE,JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 205-07 (1987); Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-
Specific Approach to the Fint Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003).
106. E.g., KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 105, at 72-73, 215.
107. Id.
108. See ALEX S. JONES, LOSING THE NEWS 18 (2009) ("News organizations are trying, ra-
tionally, to save their business, but that is not the same thing as saving the news."). Levi
discusses these problems with respect to electronic media, but her arguments apply more
generally. Levi, supra note 11, at 1324-30.
109. Levi, supra note 11, at 1324-30.




114. Id. at 1327.
115. Id.
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"blurring of news and entertainment" has led to the airing of ex-
treme viewpoints as a substitute for good, factual reporting."' It is
clear that the focus on profit has deleterious effects on the quality
of the journalism.
II. GRADING THE NEWS: THEJOURNALISM RATINGS BOARD
The reform proposed in this Note accepts the premise that
modem journalism is focused on the bottom line, and it attempts
to use that fact to incentivize better journalism. Additionally, an
incentive-based approach naturally straddles the divide between
economic and substantive regulation, and thus is one of the
strongest means of reform that will still be constitutional."'7 To rea-
lign incentives, cable news profit must be tied to quality journalism.
Generally, cable news profit is based on audience size."8 People
primarily watch news to be better informed, and are more likely to
watch news programs they feel most accurately report the news."'
Informing viewers of the news programs' journalistic value enables
consumers to make the most informed decision about which pro-
grams to watch. Knowing that this information will be
instantaneously available to their viewers, cable news companies
will have to compete on quality in order to retain a profitable mar-
ket share. To facilitate such competition, the JRB will rate the
journalistic value of cable news shows based upon well-founded
principles of good journalism, publishing the ratings through re-
ports and "news consumer guidelines" (NCGs).
This Part outlines parameters for the JRB's implementation,
fleshing out its two overarching goals: maximizing the usefulness of
the ratings and minimizing the capacity for abuse. The metrics
used to define good journalism must achieve a balance between
simplicity and completeness, and between objective standards and
expert opinion. This Part begins by choosing the rating system
structure. Next, it discusses which metrics should be used and
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
118. Advertising sales drive profit. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. A
greater audience size means advertisers will pay more, creating more profit.
119. THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, AMERICANS SPENDING
MORE TIME FOLLOWING THE NEWS 53 (2010), available at http://people-
press.org/report/?pageid=1795 (All reasons listed in the chart except for "entertainment
constitute a general desire to be better informed. Aside from the two Comedy Central pro-
grams, which do not bill themselves as news, "entertainment" received at most an 18% share
of reasons to consume news. This means, in the worst case-the morning shows-82% of
people consume news to be better informed).
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where they come from. Finally, this Part concludes with strategies
to reduce the possibility for abuse of the ratings. Obviously, gov-
ernment control of media operation is inherently troubling, so
having various checks to reduce the potential for abuse is crucial.
Concerns about the selection and appointment process, term
length, and partisan versus non-partisan components must be ad-
dressed in the creation of the JRB.
A. The Choice of Rating Systems
Rating systems are used in many different contexts to stimulate
competition based on quality. 20 The federal government rates fi-
121 - 22nancial institutions2 ' and energy consumption in appliances.
Zagat Survey and Consumer Reports rate restaurants23 and prod-
ucts.124 Since the advent of the internet, user ratings have become
important parts of our collective decision-making processes.25 So-
called "democratic news aggregators"2" reddit' and Digg 2 8 use
ratings to determine what news links make it to the front page. Rat-
ing systems are being proposed to improve public agencies, too.
Professor Heather Gerken has proposed the Democracy Index to
rate state election systems and polling places so that state funding
agencies and poll-watchers may know best where to focus their re-
120. See DAVID ROODMAN, BUILDING AND RUNNING AN EFFECTIVE POLICY INDEx: LES-
SONS FROM THE COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPMENT INDEX 1 (2006), available at
http://www.cgdev.org/files/6661_fileEssay_2.pdf ("Indexes, which distill large amounts of
information into a few numbers, appear to be gaining popularity among policy advocates
and researchers.").
121. FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values, FDIC, http://fdic.gov/about/mission/index.html
(last updated May 4, 2009).
122. About Energy Star, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c
=about.ab_ index (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
123. Overview, ZAGAT SURVEY, http://www.zagat.com/About/Index.aspx?menu=
companyOverview (last visted Sept. 29, 2010).
124. Our Mission, CONSUMER REPORTS, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/aboutus/
mission/overview/index.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
125. See, e.g., Detailed Seller Ratings, EBAY.COM, http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/
detailed-seller-ratings.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2010); GLASSDOOR.COM, http://
www.glassdoor.com/index.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (jobs); METACRITIC, http://
www.metacritic.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (movies, television, games, and music); ROT-
TEN TOMATOES, http://www.rottentomatoes.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (movies); YELP,
http://yelp.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (restaurants and other businesses).
126. These are also called "social news aggregators." See, e.g., Lauren Dugan, 3 Social
News Aggregators You'll Actually Use, Soc. TIMES (July 14, 2010, 1:10 PM), http://
www.socialtimes.com/2010/07/3-social-news-aggregators-youll-actually-use/.
127. Frequently Asked Questions, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/help/faq#
Whatisreddit (response to "What Is reddit?") (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
128. What Is Digg, DIGG, http://about.digg.com/about (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
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sources on Election Day.'" The Environmental Protection Index
(EPI), championed by Professor Dan Esty, has changed environ-
mental debates around the world.'"0
Three broad questions arise when designing a rating system.
First, what type it will be-centralized or decentralized, govern-
ment or private? Second, on what will the ratings be based? Third,
how will the ratings induce the desired effect? This Part addresses
the first question, the second question is the subject of Part II.B,
and the third is the subject of Part III.
There are many possible structures for rating systems. This Note
characterizes them in two dimensions: "centralized" versus "decentral-
ized" and public versus private. Centralized ratings are compiled by
experts with the requisite credentials and disseminated to the public.
Decentralized ratings are based on aggregated lay opinion. Due most-
ly to the scale made possible by internet, decentralized ratings have
grown in popularity. Expert ratings persist, however, in book and mov-
ie reviews published by newspapers, ratings of financial institutions,
the EPI, and Gerkin's Democracy Index, for example. The public-
private distinction rests on whether the government has sponsored
the ratings, as in the FDIC ratings of financial institutions, or has not,
as is true of the EPI.
In choosing between centralized and decentralized ratings, the
determinate question is whether lay people possess the collective
capability to generate useful ratings. Capability hinges on whether
particular expertise is required in ratings, whether consumers pos-
sess all the information necessary to make proper judgments, and
whether lay people encounter the phenomenon being rated regu-
larly enough to generate statistically relevant pool of ratings. Today,
decentralized ratings and paid critics exist side by side for consum-
er electronics, restaurants,' 2 and movies.' Other areas, however,
do not lend themselves to decentralization. Banks do not willingly
129. See HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEx 5 (2009).
130. Alan Bisbort, New Index Grades Countries on Current Environmental
Performance, ENVIRONMENTAL YALE, Spring 2006, at 14, available at http://
environmental.yale.edu/topics/2136; GERKEN, supra, note 129, at 55.
131. See, e.g., Apple i-Phone 4 Review, CNET, http://reviews.cnet.com/iphone-4-
review?tag-contentMain;contentBody (last visited Sept. 29, 2010) (showing examples of
centralized and decentralized ratings together).
132. Compare Dining & Wine, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/pages/dining/
index.html (last visted Sept. 29, 2010) (displaying examples of centralized food critic rat-
ings), with YELP, http://www.yelp.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2010) (displaying examples of
decentralized food critic ratings from lay users).
133. Compare ROBEREBERT.COM, http://rogerebert.suntimes.com (last visited Sept. 29,
2010) (displaying examples of centralized movie ratings from professional film critic Roger
Ebert), with YAHOO!MovIEs, http://www.movies.yahoo.com (displaying examples of decen-
tralized movie ratings from lay users).
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publish the information necessary to rate them, and most lay peo-
ple would not understand it anyway.' Most lay people, having
access only to localized anecdotes, also lack the ability to perform
big-picture analysis and could not generate ratings like the EPI,
which analyzes data from 136 countries.135
The JRB's ratings must be centralized. The JRB is premised on
the idea that the public needs a rating system to evaluate the quali-
ty of the news they are watching, precisely because it is so difficult
to discern. Separating news from spin, and understanding what is
not being reported is near impossible; the average American simply
does not have the time or resources to investigate the veracity of
every news report. Additionally, any lay rating of news would suffer
from the same ideological separation affecting blogs: each side of a
debate would merely decry the others' facts as spin and inaccurate
reporting.136 If lay people could, even in the aggregate, accurately
report on the quality of the news, profit and quality journalism
might already be aligned, making this proposal unnecessary.
Whether the centralized system should be public or private de-
pends in part on the mechanics of how the ratings will be
disseminated to the public. This question is the subject of Part III,
but the conclusion is important for the purposes of rating system
selection. If, as Part III argues, more than mere publication of the
ratings is required to achieve the desired effect, the ratings will re-
quire the force of law and therefore some government
involvement. In addition, it will be very easy for either side of a
highly charged political environment to tarnish any private rating
system with accusations of partisanship, regardless of the veracity of
that charge. The possibility of built-in partisan dilution, transpar-
134. One need only look at all eleven sections and eight appendices of the Trust Exam-
ination Manual, just a part of the examination undertaken by the FDIC, to be convinced
that the average financial consumer could not adequately evaluate the financial stability of
banks. Trust Examination Manual, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/
trustmanual/ index.html (last updated May 12, 2005).
135. See YALE CTR. FOR ENVTL LAW AND POL'Y ET AL., 2010 ENVIRONMENTAL PERFOR-
MANCE INDEX: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2010), available at http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/
repository/ epi/data/2010EPI_ summary.pdf.
136. See CAss R. SUNsTEIN, REPUBLiC.COM 2.0, at 71-75 (2001) (discussing the phenome-
non of group polarization). A growing movement for pure fact-checking of the Sunday talk
shows is actually testing this idea. Meet The Facts, a new website dedicated to fact-checking the
show Meet the Press, has recently decided to try community based fact-checks. Help Fact-Check the
5/2 Meet the Press, MEET THE FACTs (May 2, 2010, 10:14 PM), http://
meetthefacts.com/2010/05/02/help-fact-check-the-5-2-meet-thepress/. Fact-checking is receiv-
ing a positive response from the news consuming public. See, e.g., Greg Sargent, Who Woulda
Thunk It: Fact-Checking Is Popular!, THE PLUM LINE (May 19, 2010, 12:53 PM), http://
voices.washingtonpost.com/plum-line/2010/05/who -woulda thunkit_fact-check.html (dis-
cussing the popularity of an emerging fact-checking movement). However, there is more work
to do than just basic fact-checking of Sunday shows.
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ency, and public accountability take a great deal of force out of this
criticism, and thus further support a government-run ratings
board.
Once the federal government is involved, three choices present
themselves as structural possibilities for the Board: an independent
agency, a sub-agency within the FCC (which is itself independent),
and a federal advisory committee under the FCC's control. Each
possibility would function in similar fashion, publishing reports
and inserting the NCGs into television programs.
Three considerations suggest a preference for a sub-agency
within the FCC: partisanship in the appointment process, the abil-
ity to mandate the publication of the ratings and NCGs, and
transparency and ethical requirements. First, avoiding partisan
appointments to the JRB is important both to ensure as unbiased
an evaluation of news as possible and to ensure the public believes
that the evaluation is unbiased.m This consideration points away
from a full agency, which would be subject to Presidential ap-
pointment and Senate confirmation. However, neither an
advisory committee nor a sub-agency within the FCC would have
such a problem."
The second consideration-the ability to mandate publication-
eliminates the federal advisory committee. An advisory committee
has no authority to regulate and only gives advice. Because it can
only give advice, there will necessarily be an extra step between the
JRB's evaluation of the news program and the implementation of
the grades by the FCC. This would allow a FCC opposed to imple-
mentation to ignore the JRB's recommendations. While the extra
separation could ease constitutional concerns by further removing
the power to rate the news from any editorial control, the JRB is
constitutional even without this extra separation.
Finally, the third consideration-transparency and ethical re-
quirements-also factors into public trust. This consideration,
137. Generally, aside from a few rare moments of uproar, the FCC is not seen by the
public as intensely political. See Russell Newman & Ben Scott, The Fight for the Future of Media,
in THE FuTuRE OF MEDIA, supra note 26, at 21, 21.
138. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law.").
139. Id. ("[Blut the Congress may by Law vest Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper . .. in the Heads of Departments."); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Account-
ing Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162 (2010) (holding in part that the SEC's ability to
appoint members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board does not violate the
Appointments Clause and that "whether one is an 'inferior' officer depends on whether he
has a superior").
140. See infra Part IV.
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however, does not point in any particular direction. The Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA) mandates a high level of trans-
parency and ethics enforcement.1 4 ' However, these standards can
and should simply be adopted by Congress in the JRB's implement-
ing legislation, regardless of the specific structure. Taking the three
factors together, a sub-agency within the FCC is the best structure
for the JRB.
B. Defining Good Journalism: Choosing the JRB's Metrics
What is "good" journalism? The question has no single answer. It
is axiomatic that a journalist's first obligation is to the truth.4 2
However, beyond the basic phrase "getting the facts right," no one
can seem to agree what "truth" means.14 Is it really more or less
"true" to write a news story more sympathetic to one side of a polit-
ical debate, or to omit a minor, mundane detail due to a word
limit? Because journalism is a profession dedicated to finding such
an elusive concept as truth, defining the best practices is a chal-
lenge, with no "right" answer. However, as Professor Gerken put it
when discussing her new rating system, "[a]s a practical matter, the
only way to settle these debates is to settle them."'4 4 This sub-part
discusses nine specific principles, which together function as one
proposal to settle the debate. In reality, the debate will be settled
when the legislation creating the JRB is passed and rehashed
whenever the ratings are revised.
Scholars substantially agree on most principles of "good journal-
ism." 4 5 Professor Jay Rosen, however, has proposed the most
141. Steven P. Croley & William E. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good Gov-
ernment, 14 YALEJ. ON REG. 451, 495-500 (1997).
142. See BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM 37 (2d ed.
2007).
143. Id.
144. GERKEN, supra note 129, at 96.
145. Professors Dan Gillmor and Jay Rosen have proposed similar criteria. See Dan
Gillmor, The End of Objectivity (Version 0.91), DAN GILLMOR ON GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM, ETC.
(Jan. 20, 2005), http://dangillmor.typepad.com/dan-.gillmor-ongrassroots/2005/01/the
end oLobje.html; Jay Rosen, Eight Key Terms for Determining Legitimacy in Journalism, JAY
ROSEN: PUBLIC NOTEBOOK (Mar. 1, 2010), http://jayrosen.posterous.com/eight-key-terms-
for-determining-legitimacy-in. The main difference between Gillmor's and Rosen's proposals
is that six of Rosen's principles cover the same ground as Gillmor's four, but, as Gillmor
acknowledges, are better separated. See Gillmor, supra ("Maybe this is part of accuracy or
thoroughness, but it seems to fit here, too."). Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel's list of ten
elements overlap with Rosen's list, though they are mostly focused on breaking down jour-
nalism's utility to self-governance, rather than the act of journalism. See KOVACH &
ROSENSTIEL, supra note 142, at 5-6. Finally, Alex Jones provides a list of five principles,
though it is not comprehensive enough. SeeJONES, supra note 108, at 43. The weakness in
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comprehensive and manageable list of principles, making it the
most appropriate basis for the JRB's definition.'o Rosen's eight
principles include veracity, accuracy, transparency, intellectual
honesty, inquiry, polyphonicity, currency, and utility.47
"Veracity" is the standard call for journalists to tell the whole
truth even when unpopular. Rosen notes that this is the main
principle from which all others are derived, which fits with his view
that journalistic authority is derived not from credentials, but from
the ability to say, "I was there, you weren't, let me tell you about
it."'4 The second principle, "accuracy," is again uncontroversial,
referring to getting the facts right.'50
"Transparency" and "intellectual honesty," Rosen's third and
fourth principles, take the place of the traditional idea of "objectiv-
ity."'"' Journalism is undergoing a sea change in its understanding
of objectivity.' The idea itself is a recent construct, becoming the
norm around the same time as codes of ethics in the 1920s, when
journalism was trying to become a more respected profession.
5 3
Today, however, the meaning of objectivity has been corrupted.5 4
In its proper meaning, objectivity is a method akin to the scientific
method, a way of looking at the facts and then coming to a conclu-
sion.'5 The journalist was never supposed to be objective or devoid
of opinion.5 6 However, that is how the word is usually understood
today.
The result of misunderstood objectivity is "he-said/she-said"
journalism, where "[n]o real attempt is made to assess clashing
truth claims in the story, even though they are in some sense the
Jones' proposal, as well as Kovach and Rosenstiel's, is the reliance on involved definitions of
objectivity. See infra text accompanying notes 154-155. Because a desire for objectivity is
assumed, some of the explicit principles advocated by Gillmor and Rosen are left out. Ko-
vach, Rosenstiel and Jones would probably agree that if journalists cannot be "objective,"
Rosen's and Gillmor's proposals are the next best thing. See KOVACH AND ROSENSTIEL, supra
note 142, at 81 (citing Gillmor, supra).
146. Rosen, supra note 145.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Jay Rosen, Foreword to ETHAN CASEY, 09/11 8:48 AM: DOCUMENTING AMERICA'S
GREATEST TRAGEDY, at v, vii (2001).
150. Rosen, supra note 145.
151. Gillmor, supra note 145; Rosen, supra note 145.
152. JONES, supra note 108, at 82 ("[T]he concept that news should be objective is in-
creasingly treated within the profession as old-fashion and outdated.").
153. Id. at 87.
154. KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 142, at 81.
155. See id. at 81-82.
156. Id. at 83.
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reason for the story."' The "symmetry ... puts the reporter in the
middle between polarized extremes," purportedly achieving objec-
tivity by not taking a side." In "he-said/she-said" reporting, stories
put forth exactly two points of view and no more."' Giving voice to
the "other side" has its roots in methodological objectivity, but
should apply only to claims that were "not verifiable by direct ob-
servation."'60 However, in "he-said/she-said" reporting, both sides
will be treated as equally credible even where one side is actually
lying outright about a verifiable fact.'"' Moreover, there are often
more than two points of view on an issue, and any view outside of
the two establishment views (in political reporting, the views of Re-
publicans and Democrats) are ignored.'6 This is the "discredited
face of objectivity."63
Many journalists recognize that no human is capable of observ-
ing "objective truth," as the corrupted definition of objectivity
requires.H Accordingly, Rosen replaces objectivity with the more con-
crete and accessible principles of "transparency" and "intellectual
honesty." Transparency means knowing where journalists are "coming
from and what [their] stake is in the matter under review," and intel-
lectual honestly means relaying information in good faith, being sure
to accurately paraphrase statements and not to distort meaning.
Even Professor Alex Jones, who believes objectivity is still essential,
states that "authentic objectivity" requires "playing it straight" with
sources, rather than "creat[ing] the illusion of fairness" by ignor-
ing the outcome "when the weight of truth is clear."'"
Furthermore, as a practical matter, credible objectivity is difficult
to maintain. Jones is correct to point out that the appearance of
objectivity has more persuasive value than even transparent subjec-
tive journalism.'" However, once the perception of objectivity is
157. Jay Rosen, He Said, She Said Journalism: Lame Formula in the Land of the Active User,
PRESSTHINK (Apr. 12, 2009, 11:46 AM), http://archive.pressthink.org/2009/04/12/hesaid_
shesaid.html.
158. Id.
159. PHILIP MEYER, ETHICALJOURNALISM 51 (1987).
160. Id.
161. "You Can't just Say the President Is Lying": The Limits of Honesty in the Mainstream Press,
FAIR (Jan.-Feb. 2005), http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2481.
162. MEYER, supra note 159, at 51.
163. JoNEs, supra note 108, at 83.
164. Id.
165. Rosen, supra note 145. Gillmor suggests transparency and "fairness," though his
use of the word "fairness" is broader, encompassing both intellectual honesty and Rosen's
"veracity." Gillmor, supra note 145. Distinguishing veracity from intellectual honesty, as
Rosen does, provides clarity.
166. JoNEs, supra note 108, at 82-83.
167. Id. at 94.
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undermined, "objective" journalism loses all credibility. This is
where the news is today, as Jones acknowledges, noting that news
consumers cry "political bias" in response to any disagreement with
or simple error in a news story.'" The appearance of objectivity,
therefore, is an unstable all-or-nothing proposition. Transparency
does not suffer from the same difficulty.
Rosen's next two principles are "inquiry" and "polyphonicity.""69
Inquiry refers to the "drive to find out, to inquire and reveal more
than what lies on the surface.""o Journalism fails if it merely repeats
claims of officials, be they of government or of public relations.
The journalistic commitment to inquiry is most familiarly embod-
ied in the expos6. Rosen uses polyphonicity to mean presenting a
"plurality of voices."7' This principle is important enough that, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, it has "long been a basic tenet of
national communications policy.",1 2 Polyphonicity is also necessary
to obtain perspectives from the different cross-sections of society,
rather than just the affluent, white, male perspective that has his-
torically dominated the media.1 7 3
Rosen's final two principles, "currency" and "utility," capture the
canonical definition of newsworthiness: that which is "timely and
relevant." Currency means "keep [ing] us up to date with a shifting
world," and utility refers to the information's usefulness to the pub-
lic."7 Neither of these principles is controversial. Most of the ten
"elements of journalism" central to Bill Kovach and Tom Rosen-
stiel's book by the same name essentially measure utility.
Journalism's "first loyalty," they write, "is to citizens.",7 5 News must
"provide people with the information they need to be free and self-
governing.",1
All of Rosen's principles are sound, but one needs to be added
in order to complete the set: source transparency. Rosen
discusses transparency as disclosing the journalist' perspective, but
source transparency is also necessary. As Gillmor has argued, source
transparency requires a link between reporting and source
168. Id. at 26-27, 115.
169. Gillmor would agree with both these principles, as the two combine to form Gill-
mor's concept of "thoroughness." Gillmor, supra note 145.
170. Rosen, supra note 145.
171. Id.
172. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972) (plurality
opinion), quoted in Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994).
173. CLINT C. WILSON 11 ET AL., RACISM, SEXISM AND THE MEDIA: THE RISE OF CLASS
COMMUNICATION IN MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 134 (3d. ed. 2003).
174. Rosen, supra note 145.
175. KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 142, at 12.
176. Id.
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material.' The most common criticism of today's media is wanton
grants of anonymity to sources.'7 1 Sources need to be identified and
have their biases aired for exactly the same reasons that journalists
do: news consumers must be able to decide for themselves how
much to credit sources. There is value to anonymous reporting,"'
but sources should be granted anonymity only for extremely
important information, with good reason, and as a last resort.'so
Finding a different source to go on the record is preferred."' This
is a question of reliability, operating very similarly to hearsay
evidence rules; the journalist is the witness, and unless the third-
party source can be properly examined, his testimony cannot be
trusted.
One obvious question about the principles discussed is why they
are not based on ethics codes, particularly given that ethics codes
are well accepted among establishment journalists.' There are
three reasons for this. First, the codes and the idea of objectivity
came into prominence around the same time, and are inextricably
intertwined. 3 To reject objectivity is to reject much of the codes.
Second, a great deal of the codes' content is "abstract in character
177. Gillmor, supra note 145. Gillmor meant this literally in the online context, as in
providing a hyperlink.
178. SeeJONES, supra note 108, at 82 (stating thatjournalists should betray their sources
more); Alicia C. Shepard, Anonymous Sources, AM. JOURNALISM REv., Dec. 1994, at 20; Andrew
Alexander, Ignoring the Rules on Anonymous Sources, WASH. POST, August 16, 2009, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/14/AR20090
8 1401 9 28.html.
But see Tom Rosenstiel, A Downward Trend in Use of Anonymous Sources: Surveys ofJournalists and
Public Opinion Place the use and Need for Anonymous Sources in a Bmader Context, NIEMAN REP.,
Summer 2005, at 38, 38, available at http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reportsitem.aspx?
id=101105 ("In cable, which is a more extemporaneous medium with very few news packag-
es and most of the time is spent in live interviews, only nine percent of the stories have
anonymous sources."). Rosenstiel, however, does not believe this is a "reflection on more
transparency, necessarily, as much as [a result of] the kind of storytelling." Transcript of
Fifth Annual Hurley Symposium, Mo. SCH. OF JOURNALISM (Mar. 17, 2005), http://
journalism.missouri.edu/news/2005/related/03-17-hurley-transcript.html (remarks of Tom
Rosenstiel). Additionally, even if cable news utilizes fewer anonymous sources than print, any
grant of anonymity with no good basis is poor practice.
179. See CECILIA FRIEND &JANE B. SINGER, ONLINEJOURNALISM ETHICS 90-91 (2007).
180. See HOMER L. HALL & LOGAN H. AIMONE, HIGH SCHOOLJOURNALISM 82 (5th prtg.
2009). Good reasons potentially include protecting the source from physical, psychological,
or professional harm; protecting the source's relatives; and protecting the source's privacy
or reputation if needed. Id.
181. See, e.g., Don Ohlmeyer, Root of All Evil, ESPN (May 25, 2010), http://
sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist=ohlmeyer_don&id=5 2 2 04 9 2 ("In theo-
ry, anonymous sources are a last resort. Reporters are challenged to get people to speak on
the record, but sometimes that's just not possible. If the source remains unnamed, it must
be a trade-off for candor and quality of information.").
182. Elliot D. Cohen, Codes ofJournalism Ethics, inJOuRNALISM ETHICS 139, 139-40 (El-
liot D. Cohen & Deni Elliott eds., 1997).
183. JONES, supra note 108, at 86.
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and prescribe[s] positive, aspirational goals (ideals) rather than
well-defined (negative) requirements."14 Thus, even when they are
correct, they are more difficult to apply than the principles dis-
cussed here. Third, the codes are not written from normative
principles, but rather stem from specific organizations' past mis-
takes."5 Therefore, it is difficult to tell if a particular code is silent
on an issue because its authors disagree with other codes, or if the
organization writing the code has simply not encountered the
problem.
Rather than journalism ethics codes, the JRB's metrics should be
based on the principles discussed in this sub-part. The principles
are undoubtedly all important, but the precise weighting and the
specific grading scheme are beyond the scope of this Note. The
question of how often the ratings should be refreshed or how deep
the analysis will go are similarly important, but also beyond the
scope of this Note.
C. Minimizing the Dangers
The dangers inherent in a government body having any control
over journalism are too obvious to miss. The risks can be divided
into two categories: (1) the standard skepticism about regulatory
agencies in general, and (2) particularly worrisome for the JRB,
the risks of partisan influence. These dangers cannot be complete-
ly neutralized, but the important question is whether they can be
minimized to the point where this proposal achieves a result better
than the status quo. This sub-part argues that the dangers can be
diluted enough, and the perils of inaction are grave enough, that
creating theJRB is justified.
1. General Criticisms of Regulation
There are many critics of regulation as a governing principle.
General criticisms of administrative agencies often revolve around
regulatory capture, a process in which the regulated industry in-
serts friendly regulators into the agency or otherwise induces
industry-friendly policies.8 6 However, it is unclear that regulatory
184. Cohen, supra note 182, at 140.
185. MEYER, supra note 159, at 19 ("In all professions, codes tend to follow the form of
past abuses.").
186. STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 26 (2008).
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capture as an independent theory is as strong as its proponents
suggest.187
The prevailing view of regulation is public choice theory, the
theory that regulatory capture is inevitable because regulators are
only motivated by their own selfish needs.88 Because industry in-
terest groups finance the legislators who control the budgets and
existence of the regulatory agencies, regulators have an incentive
to align their agency with industry interests to retain their jobs."9
In addition, because industry companies may hire regulators after-
their government service-the so-called "revolving door" prob-
lem-regulators have an incentive to adopt policies favorable to
their future suitors.' Either way, the theory goes, regulator self-
interest ensures industry capture of the agency.
This theory, however, has both empirical and conceptual flaws.
For example, evidence shows that many administrators are moti-
vated by a philosophical commitment to the mission of the agency,
and are not motivated by pure self-interest.' Accordingly, a guar-
antee of regulatory capture appears overly cynical. 9 2 However, even
accepting arguendo that industry interest groups control agencies,
there also exists well-organized "public interest" lobbying on behalf
of the public. 9 3 When industry and public interest groups conflict
(or industry groups conflict with each other), one group's view
must be better for society than the other.'" Therefore, regulators,
principled or not, have more political cover and incentive to
choose the option better for the public."1
While public choice theory seems too simple a theory of regula-
tory ineffectiveness, there may exist other problems with
administrative agencies. Nevertheless, the public has decided to
live with them; agencies continue to make up a large part of the
federal government. Therefore, to the extent regulatory capture or
any other problems exist, it is hard to see why they pose any greater
threat to the JRB than to other agencies.
187. Id. at 14-25, 53-76.
188. Id. at 26-27.
189. Id. at 17.
190. Id. at 49.
191. Id. at 44-47, 49.
192. Id. at 49-51.
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2. Removal of Partisan Influence
The dangers that pertain more specifically to the JRB lie in par-
tisan influence on the Board or individual viewpoint censorship on
a single issue. With most regulatory agencies, we accept a change
in agency philosophy as a consequence of elections. Given the me-
dia's ability to affect public opinion, however, it is crucial that JRB
member appointments, reports, and NCGs are not made on a par-
tisan basis, and that there is no viewpoint censorship. There must
be structural safeguards built into the JRB to prevent amplification
of a partisan redefinition of "news."
Congress can embed transparency and independence require-
ments into the JRB's enacting legislation. The powers and
responsibilities of an agency "are limited . . . chiefly by congres-
sional imagination,"96 and imposing strict transparency and ethics
requirements is certainly permitted. Though the JRB is a sub-
agency, and not a federal advisory committee, FACA provides a
useful guide to transparency and independence.'98
FACA requires all committee members to be selected in compli-
ance with the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (EGA),'" which
mandates that before appointing a member, a committee must
check for conflicts of interest and activity as a foreign principal,200
and weigh them against the value of the individual's service.20' The
particular degree to which agencies must enforce these ethics
mandates is flexible. As Professor Steven Croley writes, " [w] hether
advisory-committee members should be required to file conflict-of-
interest reports which disclose their financial interest, and, afortio-
7i, whether members' reports should be available to the public,
requires balancing administrative efficiency against openness and
even-handedness." 202 With regard to the JRB, public trust is the
most important factor, for without it the ratings will be ignored and
the JRB will have no effect. Therefore, the selection process should
196. JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW Sys-
TEM 15 (6th ed. 2009).
197. There is, however, a limit to independence: inferior officers cannot be solely be-
holden to an already independent agency. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (2010).
198. See generally Croley & Funk, supra note 141, at 495-500.
199. Ethics in Government Act of 1978 § 402, 5 U.S.C. App. § 402 (2006).
200. Defined as a foreign government or political party, a foreign citizen not domiciled
in the United States, a partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other combi-
nation of persons organized under the laws of or having its principal place of business in a
foreign country. See 22 U.S.C. § 611(b) (2006).
201. Croley & Funk, supra note 141, at 496-97.
202. Id. at 498-99.
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adhere to the highest standards of ethics. The legislation creating
the JRB should specify such measures.
Additionally, FACA creates selection criteria for the committee
as a whole, namely, "fair balance."203 Once again, this is ill-defined,
but advisory groups often try to keep themselves balanced on a
wide variety of criteria, including among other things, political par-
ty, race, age, religion, ethnic, gender, and geography, as well as
representatives of industry and public interest groups.m This aligns
exactly with the goals of the JRB and should be codified into its
enacting legislation.
Congress must also directly insert transparency requirements in-
to the law creating the JRB. Transparency would involve recording
most or all meetings, having them open to the public and provid-
ing transcripts online, and allowing public access to all reports,
including a write-up of the reasoning behind all the grades. These
transparency requirements would allow private watchdog groups to
keep the JRB honest.
The composition of the Board itself is a more difficult question
to answer. Should it be bipartisan, nonpartisan, or some combina-
tion? How long should the terms be for JRB members? Are there
other employees and if so, what are their functions? Who will be
appointed? Many of these details, while not unimportant, will de-
pend on budget and the form of the final legislation. But there are
lessons to be taken from current independent administrative agen-
cies.
The JRB should be based on a bipartisan model, similar to the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC). And while there are benefits to an
even or odd number of voting Board members-the FEC has six 0 .
and the SEC five,06 and in neither agency can more than three be
of the same party o'-the JRB must have an odd number of board
members. The FEC's six-member structure was implemented so
that one political party could not launch an investigation on an-
other without at least one vote from the other side.2 08 However,
deadlocks, while not common, have affected important cases,200
203. Id. at 499.
204. Id. at 500.
205. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 § 307, 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (2) (A) (2006).
206. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006).
207. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (2) (A).
208. No independent or member of a third party has ever been appointed. Bradley A.
Smith & Stephen M. Hoersting, A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence and Overenforce-
ment at the Federal Election Commission, 1 ELECTION L.J. 145, 158 n.97 (2002).
209. See Vassia Gueorguieva, Election Administration Bodies and Implementation Tools, 13
GEO. PUB. POL'Y REv. 95, 101-02 (2008).
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and are a source of criticism of the FEC.210 While prohibiting one
political party from attacking another is a worthy consideration,
the JRB's functionality is very different from the FEC. Because the
FEC responds to complaints, non-action-essentially equivalent to
dismissing the claim-is a permissible outcome. But because the
JRB issues regular reports based on current information, lack of
action does not approximate a permissible outcome; the only per-
missible outcome is generating a current report. Accordingly, there
must be an odd number of members despite the risk of partisan
attack. Other partisan safeguards will protect the agency against
partisan takeover; equal representation need not accomplish non-
partisanship itself.
Although a bipartisan JRB could look more favorably upon re-
porting that dismisses third-party political candidates, that criticism
does not fatally discredit a bipartisan JRB. The current dominance
of the two political parties is not in question, so bipartisanship is
the best approximation of non-partisanship.21' Additionally, all sus-
picions of administrator partisan motivation implicitly rely on the
premise that regulators are selfishly motivated, a notion not uni-
versally agreed upon. Accordingly, bipartisan membership would
best protect against partisan capture.
The JRB should also emulate agencies that have used longer, ro-
tating terms to alleviate partisanship. For example, the SEC's five
members are appointed in staggered five-year terms so that one
will be replaced each year. This ensures that in a single presidential
term, at least one commissioner will be held over. The Federal Re-
serve Board of Governors (The Fed) takes this a step further. Its
seven members are appointed to fourteen-year terms, which expire
every two years.1 2 Absent premature vacancies, a single sitting pres-
ident may replace at most half of The Fed, severely limiting
possibilities for full partisan takeover. Moreover, The Fed's board
members cannot be re-nominated, further insulating them from
214
the whims of any given administration. Given the importance of
removing partisanship in the context of the JRB, these examples
should be followed, though the particulars of term length are be-
yond the scope of this Note.
Finally, there must be a robust appeals process. After the
FCC adopts the grades, a ruling should be administratively
210. See, e.g., Smith & Hoersting, supra note 208, at 158.
211. Another option could be a nine-person board with three members from both the
Republican and Democratic parties, and three appointed by outside groups.
212. CROLEY, supra note 186, at 26-27.
213. Federal Reserve Act § 10, 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2006).
214. Id.
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challengeable as unfairly content-based or for other reasons. This
would further guard against ideological corruption of the JRB.
In sum, there are ways of addressing the threat of partisanship
within the JRB. By incorporating the general structure advocated
above and ensuring transparency, the JRB can reliably serve its
function of improving cable news over today's status quo.
III. NEWS CONSUMER GUIDELINES
The JRB has, by design, only a limited capacity to affect journal-
ism. Because any direct control over content would be
unconstitutional, a market-based approach is required. Markets
rely on complete information reaching consumers, and thus the
JRB's potential will be reached only by including a mechanism for
delivering the different ratings. This Part proposes that Congress
give the FCC the power to require cable news programs to provide
"news consumer guidelines" (NCGs) based on regular reports is-
sued by the JRB.
The appearance of the NCGs will closely mirror parental guide-
lines in entertainment programs.' Parental guidelines are
unobtrusive, brief, and easy to ignore, but provide important in-
formation about the program the viewer is about to watch. The
rating appears in a small black box on the upper-left corner of the
screen for fifteen seconds at the start of the program and often
upon return from each commercial break.1  Because the ratings
are not mandated by law,'17 there is significant variation in style and
length between networks.21 ' However, the different networks' pa-
rental guidelines all provide the same basic information.2 ' 9 The
NCGs would adopt a similar scheme-fifteen seconds at the start of
each half hour and at least a brief appearance after each commer-
cial break.
The NCGs should also include sub-ratings because a simple letter
grade is not informative enough. Two possibilities for the
sub-ratings' presentation are either a format similar to that used in
215. See generally About the TV Ratings and the V-Chip, THE TV PARENTAL GUIDELINES,
http://www.tvguidelines.org/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
216. TV Parental Guidelines: Design Variations, SERVING HIsT., http://
www.servinghistory.com/topics/TVParentalGuidelines::sub::Design_Variations (last visited
Sept. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Design Variations].
217. TV Parental Guidelines, SERVING HIST., http://www.servinghistory.com/topics/TV__
ParentalGuidelines (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
218. Id.
219. Design Variations, supra note 216.
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parental guidelines220 or a color-coding scheme. Parental guidelines
include a letter to indicate the various elements that make up the
rating.22' For example, if intense violence is an element in a TV-14
rating, a small "V" appears underneath the "TV-14" rating.222 If vio-
lence is not a factor or only a moderate factor, no "V" appears.
Similarly, the different JRB metrics should be labeled with a letter
and posted underneath the JRB assigned grade if the metrics con-
tribute to a reduction in the grade. The color-coding option would
amount to presenting all the metrics and coloring them green and
red for positive and negative contributions. Either way, the infor-
mation is disseminated in an easily consumable form.
Packaging the ratings with the news programs themselves is im-
portant. Media watchdog groups currently publish a great deal of
media criticism and ratings for viewers who seek it.224 However,
most news consumers do not know to look for that information, so
providing it in a form that does not require extra effort is crucial.
This same concern was the impetus for congressionally imposed
disclosures on drugs and other consumer products. The health
risks associated with cigarettes were known before Congress placed
a Surgeon General's warning on cigarette packets and advertise-
ments. 2 2 5 Rather than leave the consumers to access and assess that
information themselves, Congress deemed it necessary to include a
Surgeon General's warning to ensure an "adequately informed"
public.2
A more recent example illustrating the necessity of labeling is
New York City's law mandating disclosure of calorie contents of food
in fast food restaurants.227 The FDA already required fast food res-
taurants to have the information available,2 but New York City
220. See, e.g., id.
221. Understanding the TV Ratings, THE TV PARENTAL GUIDELINES, http://
www.tvguidelines.org/ratings.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. See Open Directory Project Watchdogs, DMOZ, http://www.dmoz.org/News/
Media/Watchdogs/ (last updated Mar. 24, 2010) (listing thirty-two watchdog groups and
linking to their websites).
225. Mark Parascandola, Public Health Then and Now: Cigarettes and the US Public Health
Service in the 1950s, 91 Am. J. Pun. HEALTH 196, 196-97 (2001) (describing the early skepti-
cism and eventual acceptance of the health risks of cigarettes by the late 1950s). The
Surgeon General's warning was not implemented until 1965. See Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act § 2, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1331(1) (2006)).
226. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act § 2.
227. N.Y.C., N.Y., 24 HEALTH CODE § 81.50 (West 2010) (section of New York City
Health Code requiring posting of calorie information).
228. See Fast Food Nutrition Facts, BUZZLE.COM, http://www.buzzle.com/articles/fast-
food-nutrition-facts.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
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determined that mere availability of the information was not
enough.22 Three studies have attempted to discern the effects of the
law, and all three have determined that the information has
changed consumers' behavior at least to a minor degree." Similarly,
the NCGs will have an effect on consumer behavior, and it seems
very unlikely that the JRB's market-based approach would be as
effective without them.
IV. THE JOURNALISM RATINGS BOARD
AND THE CONSTITUTION
As First Amendment doctrine stands, most forms of media re-
form will be constitutionally suspect. Accordingly, this Note must
consider whether the JRB and its authority to embed the NCGs in
news programs are constitutional. The First Amendment question
must be broken down into three separate parts: 1) whether the
JRB's mandate is content-discriminatory or content-neutral;
2) whether the JRB suppresses speech in such a way as to violate
intermediate scrutiny; and 3) whether the NCGs amount to uncon-
stitutional compelled speech. This Section argues that the JRB's
mandate is content-neutral and does not suppress speech; accord-
ingly, the NCGs are constitutional.
Without the NCGs, the proposal would not pose any First
Amendment difficulty, as the government is free to opine publicly
on a subject. Additionally, as this Part will argue, assuming their
content-neutrality, the NCGs are easy to recognize as constitutional
by analogy to required posting of nutrition information and sur-
geon general's warnings on cigarette packaging. Therefore, the
difficult First Amendment question lies in the combination-if the
NCGs are based on disapproval of particular content or viewpoints,
the analogy to nutrition information breaks down. Once the JRB
ratings are deemed content-neutral, a regulation based on them
will receive intermediate scrutiny, and thus must be shown not to
suppress speech or unduly infringe on other First Amendment
rights. Accordingly, this Part first discusses the content-neutrality of
the JRB to assess the difficult question. It then demonstrates that
229. N.Y.C., N.Y., 24 R.C.N.Y. § 81.50.
230. Marion Nestle, New Yok's Calorie Counts: A Good National Model, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 30,
2010, http://www.newsweek.com/id/237199. The varying degrees of effectiveness are prob-
ably a result of unintended consequences such as consumers trying to get the most calorie
value for their money. No similar "best value for the money" principle would apply in the
cable news context.
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the JRB does not suppress speech and content-neutral NCGs are
indeed constitutional.
A. The fRB: A Content-Based Yet Content Neutral Policy
The first constitutional question is whether the JRB's ratings are
"content-based," as the term is used in Turner I 21 Content-based
policies are generally subject to strict scrutiny, and are invariably
struck down.232 However, the law surrounding content-based and
content-neutral policies is far from clear.2 In order to understand
the meaning of the phrase "content-based," it is important to first
understand the hierarchy of viewpoint and content discrimination
in First Amendment doctrine.
A speech regulation occupies one of three spaces: viewpoint-
discriminatory, content-discriminatory, or content-neutral. A view-
point-discriminatory law bases its regulation on approval of a
particular message. ("You are permitted to speak only if you say
that abortion is wrong.") Viewpoint-discriminatory policies are in-
herently problematic and will always be subject to strict scrutiny.m
Content-discriminatory policies base their regulation on whether a
topic is discussed at all. ("You may speak as long as you do not
mention abortion.") Content-discriminatory policies tend to re-
ceive strict scrutiny except in certain limited cases when speech is
completely unprotected.2 5 Finally, content-neutral policies do not
depend on the speech content in any way. ("You may speak in the
town hall after 8PM.") These regulations are subject to intermedi-
ate scrutiny, a level of scrutiny between strict scrutiny and rational
236basis review.
The Turner I Court used the term "content-based" in a way that
most closely resembles either viewpoint- or content-discrimination:
231. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner]), 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
232. E.g., LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY & R. GEORGE WRIGHT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 33 (2004).
233. Id. at 35.
234. E.g., RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest form . . . ." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
235. E.g., R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 390.
236. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662. Content-neutral regulations like this may alternatively re-
ceive no scrutiny at all if they are unrelated to speech. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. 478 U.S.
697 (1986) (holding that the First Amendment was not implicated where an anarchist
bookstore was closed under a law banning public sex acts rather than for speech-related
reasons).
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[T]he "principal inquiry in determining content neutrality. . .
is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the
message it conveys ....
As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored
speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or
views expressed are content based. By contrast, laws that con-
fer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference
to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content
neutral.
The first part of the Court's analysis mistakenly equates content-
based regulation with viewpoint discrimination, but the phrase
"without reference to the ideas or views expressed," goes beyond
mere viewpoint neutrality to content neutrality.23' Therefore, the
ultimate effect of Turner Ion the doctrine is unclear.
However, it is clear that mere examination of content in decision-
making does not render a policy "content-based." In Turner I, Con-
gress specifically justified the must-carry provisions at issue by
reference to the importance of the local content available in
broadcast programming.239 The Court flatly rejected the proposi-
tion that this justification renders the provisions content-based."
Similarly, policies encouraging viewpoint diversity require some
content-based analysis.' It would make no sense for all such poli-
cies to be immediately suspect, especially considering the Court
has indicated that viewpoint diversity is itself an important First
Amendment interest.242
Because the JRB evaluates news programs based on the quality
of the news, the creation of the JRB is a content-based policy in the
typical linguistic sense. But the JRB is not legally content-based.
The JRB's ratings are similar to the must-carry provisions in Turner
I in that they do examine the content. However, just as the local
237. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 642-43 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
238. Justice O'Connor pointed this out in her Turner H dissent, stating that the ques-
tions of content and viewpoint neutrality are mutually independent, and claiming that the
Court was improperly confusing the two. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S.
180, 257 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court has on numerous other occasions
considered viewpoint and content neutrality as separate issues. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 361-62 (2003); RA. V, 505 U.S. at 388-90.
239. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 648.
240. Id. at 648-49.
241. See LIDSKY & WIuGHT, supra note 232, at 37.
242. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663; see supra note 69 and text accompanying supra note 61.
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nature of the programming was irrelevant to the content neutrality
analysis, the metrics upon which the JRB bases its decisions do not
render it content-based; ratings will not be based on whether or
not certain individual topics are carried. The JRB will focus on
content only in the limited context of evaluation according to the
various metrics (e.g., veracity and accuracy). While this is an aspect
of content, it is more appropriately termed "meta-content."
While the term "meta-content" does not appear in First
Amendment case law, it accurately describes several different oc-
currences. For example, aesthetics are a permissible reason for
zoning regulations. 43 So while a city may not ban "For Sale" signs, a
city may ban all signs.2" However, few people would argue that in
the context of the art world or how one dresses each day, aesthetics
are not protected speech.
Defamation law provides another example, in that "truth is an
absolute defense."'45 In this context it is clear that truth or
falsehood is not merely a content-laden value judgment, but
rather something that can remove itself from the process. In a
libel action, other forms of content determine things like
damages, but truth is a threshold question that disposes of the
matter entirely.2" The JRB's approval of the particular messages
will not influence the grades they receive, except that the JRB will
disapprove of deception and intentional distortion of debate. As
defamation law makes clear, a law that reacts to the veracity
of claims is a permissible form of content-based regulation,
specifically, meta-content-based, and is distinguishable from
viewpoint or content discrimination.247
Because the JRB's ratings are neither viewpoint- nor content-
discriminatory, they are appropriately considered content-neutral
and must survive intermediate scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny is
satisfied if the law "furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
243. Linmark Associates v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 ("The township has not prohib-
ited all lawn signs or all lawn signs of a particular size or shape in order to promote aesthetic
values or any other value unrelated to the suppression of free expression." (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Smith v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. 614 F. Supp. 558, 561 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
246. Id.
247. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (holding that constitu-
tional protections for speech require, among other characteristics, a "falsehood" in order to
find tortious libel).
248. The JRB must really survive "intermediate-plus" scrutiny, see supra text accompany-
ing note 86, but the heightened scrutiny merely adds a Congressional record of evidence
showing that such a measure is necessary, and does not change the a priori analysis. See
Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 666.
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suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest."2 19 It is unlikely there will be
much debate about the first criterion; the institutional integrity of
the press and the public's right to receive diverse sources of infor-
mation necessary to self-government are substantial government
interests. 250 The next two sub-parts deal with the questions of
speech suppression and incidental restriction of other First
Amendment freedoms.
B. Speech Suppression
The analogy to of the JRB to defamation law must be fleshed out
a little further because New York Times Co. v. Sullivan protects the
press from libel against public figures absent "actual malice."a2 The
Court's reasoning however, is a practical one: If public figures
could sue in libel, then publishers would be afraid to criticize, and
such a rule would "dampen[] the vigor and limit[] the variety of
public debate."5 Notably, the Court did not say merely that truth
was not a separate consideration, as defamation of private individ-
uals works the same as it ever has. So the question for the JRB,
then, is whether the ratings will dampen the ardor of debate in the
same way that a libel suit would. This is one way to rephrase the
intermediate scrutiny requirement that the "governmental interest
[be] unrelated to the suppression of free expression."2 3
The difference between a libel suit and the JRB is obvious. A li-
bel suit, with the potential for millions of dollars in damages based
on one incident, is extremely coercive. The JRB, on the other hand
is an incentive-based approach. Instead of civil penalties, the rat-
ings merely alert viewers that the program has cngaged in poor
journalism in the past. The proposal, even at its most successful,
would work only by inducing behavior through competition.
There are two reasons that the JRB's ratings do not reach the
level of coercion of a libel suit. First, unlike a libel suit, no news
programs could receive a bad grade because of a single error in a
story. If the ratings worked that way, there would be wild swings in
ratings that would undermine their utility. Therefore, in order to
249. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)).
250. Id. at 663.
251. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
252. Id. at 279.
253. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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receive a bad grade based solely on misreporting, there must be a
sustained pattern of misreporting. And that sustained pattern
should create enough of an inference of "actual malice" to satisfy
Sullivan, assuming the "actual malice" standard must be met.
Second, even if the inference of malice is inappropriate, a libel suit
is a much more coercive form of punishment than publicly an-
nouncing that inaccuracies occurred. Thus even a grade based on
a single lie should not violate Sullivan per se. Accordingly, the JRB
would not suppress speech as Sullivan suggests.
When Near v. Minnesota banned prior restraints on publications,
the Court left open the question of whether subsequent punishment
would be allowed for what had already been printed.15 To suggest
that the type economic regulation proposed here is coercive
enough to reach the debate-dampening level of Sullivan is to sug-
gest that the window between Sullivan and Near must be closed and
no regulation of news is possible. The First Amendment has not
been held to mean that,2 5 6 and such an interpretation would make
the press, in the control of a few media companies, completely un-
accountable legally. This would certainly be an intolerable result.
Rather than suppressing free expression outright, the JRB ratings
affect speech to no greater degree than governmental subsidization
of programming, and in the same way: economically. Like govern-
ment subsidies, the JRB ratings are constitutional under the
"subsidized speech doctrine," an offshoot of the better known
"unconstitutional conditions doctrine."' To be sure, economic in-
centives designed to alter speech cannot be entirely disconnected
from censorship. Rather, there is a spectrum along which such poli-
cies reside.5 Specifically, the government cannot condition a
benefit on the abdication of some First Amendment right.259 For ex-
ample, a law that conditioned a property-tax exemption on one's
254. The standard for "actual malice" is met with "reckless disregard of whether [the
reporting is] false or not." Id. at 280. This is a less exacting standard than that of racial dis-
crimination cases under the equal protection clause, which requires intent. Yet the use of
repeated discriminatory effects is commonly used in proving even intent. See, e.g., Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law
bears more heavily on one race than another.").
255. Near v. Minn. ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931).
256. The Court has stated dicta that "(a] responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable
goal, but press responsibility ... cannot be legislated." Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974). However, as with many overly sweeping statements by the Court,
this is not the law, and would be absurd if taken literally.
257. Goodman, supra note 23, at 231-38; Goodman, supra note 20, at 1462-65.
258. See Goodman, supra note 23, at 235-36 (discussing "subsidized speech doctrine");
see also LIDSKY & WRIGHT, supra note 230, at 37.
259. 1 HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONs LAw 97 (1999).
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willingness to sign a loyalty oath was ruled unconstitutional even
though it could be considered an economic incentive.2 6 The prob-
lem with the tax exemption was that the conditioned oath was
"aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas."2 6' Suppressing
"dangerous ideas" discriminates based on content. Thus, whether
an economic incentive is constitutional under the subsidized
speech doctrine depends on whether the condition is content-
discriminatory. While the rating provided by the JRB can be con-
sidered a government benefit with a corresponding economic
value, it does not condition that benefit on content discrimination,
as discussed in the previous sub-part. Accordingly, the JRB's ratings
do not even approach the unconstitutional extreme of subsidized
speech spectrum, and the speech-suppression prong of intermedi-
ate scrutiny is satisfied.
C. The NCGs are Constitutionally Permissible Compelled Speech
As the previous two sub-parts demonstrated, the JRB and its re-
ports are content-neutral and do not suppress speech. The only
remaining question is whether a law requiring the publication of
NCGs is also constitutional. It is the third prong of intermediate
scrutiny--incidental restrictions on other First Amendment free-
doms-that governs the compelled broadcasting of the NCGs. And
just as speech suppression and prior restraint do not invalidate the
JRB, the compelled speech doctrine will not invalidate the NCGs.
As a general matter, there is a "constitutional equivalence of
compelled speech and compelled silence in the context of fully
protected expression." 2 For the First Amendment to protect free-
dom of thought, freedom to refrain from speaking out against
one's own beliefs must be protected as well as freedom to speak.2
Despite this rationale, the protection extends to disclosure of facts
as well as subjective opinions.m
Compelled commercial speech, on the other hand, is far less
troublesome. The Court has noted that the Constitution "accords a
lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitution-
260. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
261. Goodman, supra note 23, at 254-55 (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 519 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
262. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
263. Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Case
ofMenu Label Laws, 12J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 159, 172 (2009).
264. Id. at 172-73.
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ally guaranteed expression. Working markets depend on con-
sumers having enough information to make good choices. It is for
this reason that misleading advertisements receive no constitution-
al protection whatsoever.2 6 Similarly, various areas of federal law
require mandatory disclosure of information. Nutrition infor-
mation, drug warnings, and earnings of public corporations are
just a few. As one commentator pointed out, the purpose of these
mandatory disclosures are to "put more information in the com-
mercial marketplace because the absence of this information can
be confusing, deceptive, or just plain incomplete." 2 6
The incompleteness of information about the quality of news
programs is the problem this entire proposal addresses. Aside from
any questions about the methods or propriety of determining an
answer to that question, once an answer exists-the result of a
functioning and content-neutral JRB-a requirement that cable
news outlets disclose the information is not a difficult constitution-
al question. In cases where mandatory disclosure is justified, the
"reasonable relationship" standard of scrutiny, the most lenient
constitutional standard, applies." Under this standard, the Court
merely asks "whether the regulation [bears] a reasonable relation-
ship to the government's stated interest in passing the
regulation." 2 9
Once the ratings are recognized as content-neutral, the re-
quirement that cable news programs air the NCGs closely parallels
requirements that food manufacturers disclose nutrition infor-
mation so that consumers may know what they are eating.7 o It also
mirrors the New York City law mandating that chain restaurants
post the calorie content of their food; the information is necessary
so that consumers may choose a healthier, more nutritious meal.
The disclosures about news programs are necessary so that con-
sumers may choose a healthier, more nutritious news source,
rather than "brain candy." Of course, not everyone will do so, but
the information must be out there to even raise the possibility, and
thus the Constitution will not bar its mandatory disclosure.
265. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
266. Id.
267. Pomeranz, supra note 263, at 178.
268. Id. at 174.
269. Id.
270. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 343-q, 343-1 (2006).
271. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming
the district court, which upheld the law using the rational basis test).
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CONCLUSION: WHILE No SOLUTION CAN SINGLY FIX THE MEDIA,
THEJRB WILL IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF CABLE NEWS
For self-government to work as intended, the American public
must be informed enough to make intelligent decisions. The me-
dia has failed in this mission for too long. Given the diverse types
of media, creating a universal solution is impossible. The First
Amendment further limits possibilities, even for solutions with re-
stricted scope. An incentive-based approach that aligns the eco-
economic incentives of cable news with quality journalism is both
constitutional and a worthy start.
The JRB is one such solution. By rating the quality ofjournalism
and relaying that information to the public, news consumers can
make more informed choices about what to watch, and news pro-
ducers will be forced to respond with better quality. Nine
principles make up the foundation of proper journalism: veracity,
accuracy, transparency, intellectual honesty, inquiry, polyphonicity,
currency, utility, and source transparency. These core principles
must be the foundation upon which the JRB develops the exact
metrics for rating cable news.
The JRB would take the form of sub-agency within the FCC, em-
powered specifically to generate reports and to publicize the
results via the NCGs. The implementing law would include ethics
restrictions and measures to ensure independence. It will also in-
clude a rigid structure that would enhance public trust of the
ratings over those of a private agency, and guard against partisan
abuses. Additionally, requiring news programs to display the NCGs
is a necessary step to truly alter consumers' behavior and, as a re-
sult, the behavior of cable news journalists.
Even if Congress does not implement the JRB, merely its pro-
posal could spur the news industry to better regulate itself. When
Congress originally proposed parental guidelines for entertain-
ment programs, the television industry developed and imposed its
own guidelines to avoid Congressional interference. As a result,
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 left the task of designing the
parental guidelines to the industry." Just as the television industry
responded to threats of Congressional action, so too might the
news industry.
272. V-Chip: Viewing Television Responsibly, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://
www.fcc.gov/vchip/#history (last visited Sept. 2, 2010).
273. Fact Sheet: Evolution of Cable Television, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (June 2000),
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/facts/csgen.html.
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In fact, there is already some evidence of such self-regulation. In
December 2009, Professor Rosen proposed fact-checking Sunday
news programs and posting the results online the following
Wednesday.7 After the idea circulated on the internet for a few
months, This Week teamed with the St. Petersburg Times' Politifact to
install it for their show.7 In response, and not to be outdone, CNN
had media critic Howard Kurtz do the same thing.7 If this small
amount of pressure began moving the news industry toward cor-
rective action, proposing the JRB could do the same.
The Supreme Court has said, "[a] responsible press is an un-
doubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility ... cannot be
legislated."7 The crisis in journalism is deep enough, and the dan-
gers to the foundations of democracy grave enough, that we must
challenge this idea in any way the Constitution will permit. If the
industry cannot be spurred to action on its own, the creation of the
JRB would create an incentive structure that would push cable
news networks to perform journalism's necessary democratic func-
tion.
274. Jay Rosen, My Simple Fix for the Messed up Sunday Shows, JAY ROSEN: PUBLIC NOTE-
BOOK (Dec. 27, 2009), http://jayrosen.posterous.com/my-simple-fix-for-the-messed-up-
sunday-shows.
275. Jake Tapper, This Week Joins with Politifact to Fact-Check the Newsmakers, ABCNEWS
(Apr. 8, 2010, 4:49 PM), http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/04/this-week-
joins-with-politifact-to-factcheck-the-newsmakers.html.
276. Eric Boehlert, The (Potential) Problem with Fact-Checking the Sunday Morning Shows,
MEDIA MATTERs (Apr. 26, 2010 9:16 AM), http://mediamatters.org/blog/201004260009;
Jamison Foser, Howard Kurtz Doesn't Know What "Fact-Checking" Is, MEDIA MATTERs (Apr. 26,
2010, 10:52 AM) http://mediamatters.org/blog/201004260013; Jamison Foser, Howard
Kurtz Doesn't Understand Fact-Checking (Con't), MEDIA MATTERS (Apr. 26, 2010, 2:00 PM),
http://mediamatters.org/blog/201004260027.
277. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
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